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Abstract
This paper presents a technique to systematically discover insider attacks in 
applications. An attack model where the insider is in the same address space as the 
process and can corrupt arbitrary data is assumed. A formal technique based on 
symbolic execution and model-checking is developed to comprehensively enumerate 
all possible insider attacks corresponding to a given attack goal. The main advantage 
o f the technique is that it operates directly on the program code in assembly language 
and no manual effort is necessary to translate the program into a formal model. We 
apply the technique to security-critical segments o f  the OpenSSH application.. 
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1 Introduction
Insider threats have gained prominence as an emerging and important class of security 
threats [1, 2]. An insider is a person who is part of the organization and either steals 
secrets or subverts the working of the organization by exploiting hidden system flaws 
for malicious purposes. For example, a web browser may have a malicious plugin that 
overwrites the address bar with the address of a phishing website. Or a disgruntled 
programmer may plant a logical flaw in a banking application that allows an external 
user to fraudulently withdraw money. Both are examples of how a trusted insider can 
compromise an application and subvert it for malicious purposes.
This paper considers application-level insider attacks. We define an application-level 
insider attack as one in which a malicious insider attempts to overwrite one or more 
data items in the application, in order to achieve a specific attack goal. The 
overwriting may be carried out by exploiting existing vulnerabilities in the application 
(e.g. buffer overflows), by introducing logical flaws in the application code or 
through malicious third-party libraries. It is also possible (though not required) to 
launch insider attacks from a malicious operating system or higher-privileged process. 
Application-level insider attacks are particularly insidious because, (1) by attacking 
the application an insider can evade detection by mimicking its normal behavior 
(from the point of view of the system), and (2) to attack the application, it  is enough 
for the insider to have the same privilege as that of the application (assuming a flat 
address space where all modules have equal privileges), whereas attacking the 
network or operating system may require super-user privileges.
Before defending against insider attacks, we need a model for reasoning about 
insiders. Previous work has modeled insider attacks at the network and operating 
system (OS) levels using higher-level formalisms such as attack graphs [3] and 
process calculi [4], However, modeling application-level insider attacks requires
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analysis of the application’s code as an insider has access to the application and can 
hence launch attacks on the application’s implementation. Higher-level models are 
too coarse grained to enable reasoning about attacks that can be launched at the 
application code level. Further, higher-level models typically require application 
vulnerabilities (if present) to be identified up-front in order to reason about insider 
attacks on the system.
This paper introduces a technique to formally model application-level insider attacks 
on the application code expressed in assembly language. The advantage of modeling 
at the assembly code-level is that the assembly code includes the program, its 
libraries, and any state added by the compiler (e.g. stack pointer, return addresses). 
Therefore, all sojtware-based insider attacks on the application can be modeled at the 
assembly-code level.
The proposed technique uses a combination of symbolic execution and model 
checking to systematically enumerate all possible insider attacks in a given 
application corresponding to an attack goal. The technique can be automatically 
deployed on the application’s code and no formal specifications need to be provided 
other than generic specifications about the attacker’s end goal(s) (with regard to the 
application’s state or final output).
The value of the analysis performed by the proposed technique is that it can expose 
non-intuitive cases of insider attacks that may be missed by manual code inspection. 
This is because the technique exhaustively considers corruptions of data items used in 
the application (under a given input), and enumerates all corruptions that lead to a 
successful attack (based on the specified attack goal). Thus, it is able to identify all 
vulnerable data items in the application corresponding to the attack goal. The results 
of the analysis can be used to guide the development of defense mechanisms (e.g.. 
assertions) to protect the application from insider attacks.
We have implemented the proposed technique as a tool, SymPLAID, which directly 
analyzes MIPS-based assembly code. The tool identifies for each attack, (1) The 
program point at which the attack must be launched, (2) The data item that must be 
overwritten by the attacker, and (3) The value that must be used for overwriting the 
data item in order to carry out the attack.
SymPLAID is built as an enhancement of our earlier tool, SymPLFIED [5], used to 
evaluate the effect of transient errors on the application. SymPLFIED also builds a 
formal model of the application at the assembly code level. However, SymPLFIED 
groups individual errors into a single abstract class {err), and considers the effect of 
the entire class of errors on the program. This is because in the case of randomly 
occurring errors, we are more interested in the propagation of the error rather than the 
precise set of circumstances that caused the error.
In contrast, security attacks are launched by an intelligent adversary and hence it is 
important to know precisely what values are corrupted by the attacker (and how the 
corruption is carried out) in order to design efficient defense mechanisms against the 
attack(s). Therefore, SymPLAID was built from the ground up to emphasize precision 
in terms of identifying the specific conditions for an attack. Thus, rather than 
abstracting the attacker's behavior into a single class, the effect of each value 
corruption is considered individually, and its propagation tracked in the program.
The paper makes the following key contributions:
1. Introduces a formal model for reasoning about application-level insider attacks at 
the assembly-code level,
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2. Shows how application-level insiders may be able to subvert the execution of the 
application for malicious purposes,
3. Describes a technique to automatically discover all possible insider attacks in an 
application using symbolic execution and model checking on the application,
4. Demonstrates the proposed techniques using a case-study drawn from the 
authentication module of the OpenSSH application[6].
2 Insider Attack Model
This section describes the attack model for insider attacks and an example scenario 
for an insider attack.
2.1 Characterization of Insider
Capabilities: The insider is a part of the application and has unfettered access to the 
program’s address space. This includes the ability to both read and write the 
program’s memory and registers. However, we assume that the insider cannot modify 
the program’s code, which is reasonable since in most programs the code segment is 
marked read-only after the program is loaded.
An attacker may get into the application (and become an insider) in one or more of 
the following ways:
1. By a logical loophole in the application planted by a disgruntled or malicious 
programmer,
2. Through a malicious (or buggy) third-party library loaded into the address space 
of the application,
3. By exploiting known security loopholes such as buffer overflow attacks and 
planting the attack code,
4. By overwriting the process’s registers or memory from another process (with 
higher privilege) or debugger,
5. Through a security vulnerability in the operating system or virtual machine (if 
present)
In each of the above scenarios, the insider can corrupt the values of either memory 
locations or registers while the application is executing. The first three scenarios only 
require the insider to have the same privileges as the applications, while the last two 
require higher privileges.
Goal: The attacker’s goal is to subvert the application to perform malicious functions 
on behalf o f the attacker. However, the attacker wants to elude detection or 
culpability (as far as possible), so the attacker’s code may not directly carry out the 
attack, but may instead overwrite elements of the program’s data or control in order to 
achieve the attacker’s aims. From an external perspective, it will appear as though the 
attack originated due to an application malfunction, and hence the attack code will not 
be blamed. Therefore, the attacker can execute code to overwrite crucial elements of 
the program’s data or control elements.
It is assumed that the attacker does not want to crash the application, but wants to 
subvert its execution for some malicious purpose. The attack is typically launched 
only under a specific set of inputs to the program (known to the attacker), and the 
input sequence that launches the attack is indistinguishable from a legitimate input for 
the program. Even if the insider is unable to launch the attack by himself/herself, 
he/she may have a colluding user who supplies the required inputs to launch the 
attack. Note that the colluding user does not need to have the same privileges as the 
insider in order to launch the attack.
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2.2 Attack Scenario
Figure 1 shows an example attack scenario where the insider has planted a “logic 
bomb” in the application which is triggered under a specific set of inputs. The bomb 
could have been planted by the insider through the first, second or third scenario 
considered in section 2.1
Iniider knows the input that 
will be given
Figure 1: Attack scenario of an insider attack
Normal users are unlikely to accidentally supply the trigger sequence and will be able 
to use the application without any problems. However, a colluding user knows about 
the time-bomb and supplies the trigger sequence as input. Perimeter based protection 
techniques such as firewalls will not notice anything amiss as the trigger sequence is 
indistinguishable from a regular input for all practical purposes. However, the input 
will trigger the time-bomb in the application thereby launching the security attack on 
behalf of the insider.
2.3 Problem Definition
The problem of attack generation from the insider’s point of view may be summed up 
as follows: “If the input sequence to trigger the attack is known (AND) the attacker’s 
code is executed at specific points in die program, what data items in the program 
should be corrupted and in what way to achieve the attack goal?”
This paper develops a technique to automatically discover conditions for insider 
attacks in an application given (i) the inputs to trigger the attack (e.g. a specific user- 
name as input), (ii) the attacker’s objective stated in terms of the final state of the 
application (e.g. to allow a particular user to log in with the wrong password) and (iii) 
the attacker’s capabilities in terms of the points from which the attack can be 
launched (e.g. within a specific function). The analysis identifies both the target data 
to be corrupted and what value it should be replaced with to achieve the attacker’s 
goal. To facilitate the analysis, the following assumptions are made about the 
attacker by the technique. (1) Only one value can be corrupted, but the corrupted 
value can be any valid value. This assumption ensures that the footprint of the attack 
is kept small which makes it easier to evade detection (from a defense technique) and 
(2) Corruption is only allowed at fixed program points. This assumption reflects the 
fact that an insider may be able launch their attacks only at fixed program points -  for 
example, where the untrusted library function is called in the program.
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3 Example Code and Attacks
This section considers an example code fragment to illustrate the attack scenario in 
Section 2.2. The example is motivated by the OpenSSH program, but is not a real 
code extract [6] (we consider the real OpenSSH application in Section 5).
Figure 2 shows an example code fragment containing the authenticate function. The 
authenticate function reads the values of the system password and the user password 
into the imp buffer. It copies the value of the system password into the src buffer and 
the value of the user password into the dst buffer. It then compares the values in the 
src and dst buffers and if they match, it returns the value 1 (authenticated). Otherwise 
it returns the value 0 (unauthenticated) to the calling function.
int authenticate(void* src, void* dst, void* temp, int len){
1: readSystemPassword(temp);
2: stmcpy(src, temp, len)
3: readUserPassword(temp);
4: stmcpy(dst, temp, len);
5: if (! stmcmp(dst, src, len)) return 1; 
return 0;Li__________ :___________
Figure 2: Code of authenticate function
We take the attacker’s perspective in coming up with insider attacks on the code in 
Figure 2. The attacker’s goal is to allow a colluding user (who may be the same 
person as the attacker) to be validated even if he/she has entered the wrong password. 
The following assumptions are made in this example, for simplicity of explanation:
1. The attack can be invoked only within the body of the authenticate function.
2. The attacker can overwrite the value of registers and local variables, but not 
global variables and heap buffers (due to practical limitations such as not 
knowing the exact address of global variables and dynamic memory)r
3. The attack points are immediately before the function calls within the 
authenticate function, i.e., the arguments to any of the functions' called by the 
authenticate function may be overwritten prior to the function call.
Table 1 shows the set of all possible attacks the attacker could launch in the above 
function. The first column shows the program point at which the attack is launched, 
the second column shows the variable to overwrite and the third column shows the 
value that should be written to the variable. The fourth column explains the attack.
A particularly interesting attack found is presented in row 6 of Table 1, where the dst 
argument of the strncpy function was set to overlay the src string in memory. This 
replaces the first character of the src string with ‘\0’, effectively converting it to a 
NULL string. The dst string also becomes NULL as the dst buffer is not filled by the 
strncpy function (we assume that it has initially been filled with all zeroes). The two 
strings will match when compared and the authenticate function will return ‘1’.
As Table 1 shows, discovering all possible insider attacks manually (by inspection) is 
cumbersome and non-trivial even for the modestly sized piece of code that is 
considered in Figure 2. Therefore, we have developed a tool to generate the attacks 
automatically - SymPLAID. Although the tool works on assembly language 
programs, we have shown the program as C-language code in Figure 2 for simplicity. 
We have validated the attacks shown in Table 1 using the GNU debugger (gdb) to 
corrupt the values of chosen variables in the application on an AMD machine running 
the Linux operating system. All the attacks in Table 1 were found to be successful i.e. 
they led to the user being authenticated in spite of providing the wrong password.
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Table 1: Insider attacks on the authenticate function
Program
Point
Variable to 
be
corrupted
Corrupted 
value of 
variable
Comments/Explanadon
strncmp 
point 
(line 5)
dst src buf The src buffer is compared with itself
src dst buf The dst buffer is compared with itself
src temp buf The dst buffer is compared with the temp buffer which contains the same string
len <= 0 The strncmp function terminates early and returns 0 (the strings are identical)
stmcpy 
point 
(line 4)
temp src buf This copies the string in the source buffer to the destination buffer, thereby ensuring that the strings match
dst srcBuf -  strlen(buf)
This writes a ‘\0’ character in the src buffer, effectively 
converting it to a empty string. The dst buffer is also 
empty as it is not initialized (assuming it is initially set to 
all zeroes), and hence the strings match.
readUser 
Password 
point 
(line 3)
temp dst buf The temp buffer originally contains the system password. 
Due to the attack, the value in the temp buffer is not 
replaced with the user password. Therefore, the system 
password is copied to die dst buffer, which matches the 
contents of the src buffer i.e. the system password.
temp
Any 
unused 
location in 
memory
The attacks in Table 1 consist of both “obvious attacks” as well as surprising comer 
cases. It can be argued that finding obvious attacks is not very useful as they are 
likely to be revealed by manual inspection o f the code. However, the power of the 
proposed technique is that it can reveal all such attacks on the code, whereas a human 
operator may miss one or more attacks. This is especially important from the 
developer’s perspective, as all the security holes in the application need to be plugged 
before it can be claimed that the application is secure (as all the attacker needs to 
exploit is a single vulnerability). Moreover, the ability to discover comer-case attacks 
is the real benefit of using an automated approach. Further, the attacks discovered by 
the technique can guide the development of defense mechanisms. For example, for 
the attacks discovered in Table 1, we insert runtime checks at the following points:
1. Before the call to the strncmp function to ensure that the src and dst buffers of 
the strncmp function do not overlap with each other or with the temp buffer in 
terms of physical locations. This prevents attacks in rows 1 to 4 of Table 1.
2. After the call to the readUserPassword function in line 3 to ensure that the temp 
buffer is non-empty. This prevents attacks in the rows 7 to 8 of Table 1.
3. Before the call to the strncpy function to ensure that neither the temp buffer nor 
the dst buffer overlap with the src buffer.
Figure 3 shows the code in Figure 2 with the checks inserted as assert statements. It is 
assumed that the checks are themselves immune to attack from an insider.
int authenticate(void* src, void* dst, void* temp, int len){
1: readSystemPassword(temp);
2: stmcpy(src, temp, len)
3: readuserPassword(temp);
assert( isNotEmpty(temp) ); assert( noOverlap(temp, srcj and noOverlap(temp, dst) ) 
4: stmcpy(dst, temp, len);
assert( noOverlap(src, dst) and noOverlap(src, temp) ); assert( len > 0 );
5: if (! stmcmp(dst, src, len)) return 1; 
return 0;
1__________________________________________________________
Figure 3: Code of authenticate function with assertions
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4 Technique and Tool
As mentioned in the previous section, enumerating insider attacks by hand is 
cumbersome and non-trivial. Therefore, automating the discovery of insider attacks is 
essential. This section describes the key techniques used in the automation and the 
design of a tool to automatically discover insider attacks in an application.
4.1 Symbolic Execution Technique
We represent an insider attack as a corruption of data values at specific points in the 
program’s execution i.e. attack points. The attack points are chosen by the program 
developer based on knowledge of where an insider can attack the application. For 
example, all the places where the application calls an untrusted third-party library are 
attack points as an insider can launch an attack from these points. In the worst-case, 
every instruction in the application can be an attack point.
The program is executed with a known (concrete) input, and when one of the 
specified execution points is reached, a single variable1 is chosen from the set of all 
variables in the program and assigned a symbolic value (i.e. not a concrete value). 
The program’s execution is continued with the symbolic value for the chosen 
variable. All other variables in the program are unchanged. The above procedure is 
repeated exhaustively for each data value in the program at each of the specified 
attack points. This allows enumeration of all insider attacks on a given program.
The key technique used to comprehensively enumerate insider attacks is symbolic 
execution-based model checking. This means that the program is executed with a 
combination of concrete values and symbolic values, and model-checking is used to 
“fill-in” the symbolic values as and when needed. Symbolic values are treated similar 
to concrete values in arithmetic and logical computations performed in the system. 
The main difference is in how branches and memory accesses based on expressions 
involving symbolic values are handled. When a memory access is performed with a 
symbolic expression as the address operand, the execution of the program is forked 
and the symbolic expression is equated to a different memory address in each fork. 
The value stored at the address is read or written in the corresponding fork and the 
program’s execution is continued. Once the symbolic value has been assigned to an 
address, all expressions involving the symbolic value in the state are concretized. 
Similarly, in the case of branches involving symbolic expressions, the program 
execution is forked at the branch point. The branch condition is added as a constraint 
to the first fork, while the negation of the condition is added as a constraint to the 
second fork. For each program fork encountered above, the model checker checks 
whether (1) The fork is a viable one, based on the past constraints of the symbolic 
expressions, and (2) whether the fork leads to a desired outcome (of the attacker). If 
these two conditions are satisfied, the model checker will print the state of the 
program corresponding to the fork i.e. attack state.
As in most model-checking approaches, the number of states explored can be 
exponential in the size of the program and its address space. However, very few of 
the states explored by the model-checker will satisfy the attacker's goal(s). Hence, the 
model-checker can prune branches of the search tree once it is clear that the branch 
will not lead to a state satisfying the goal. This is the key to the scalability of the 
approach, and underlies the importance of specifying a attack goal for the insider. In 
the absence of a goal state, the model checker may suffer from state space explosion.
1 We use the generic term variable to refer to both registers and memory locations in the program.
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4.2 SymPLAID Tool
The symbolic execution technique described in the previous section has been 
implemented in an automated tool -  SymPLAID (Symbolic Program Level Attack 
Injection and Detection). This is based on our earlier tool, SymPLFIED, used to study 
the effect of transient errors on programs [5].
SymPLAID accepts the following inputs: (1) an assembly language program along 
with libraries (if any), (2) a set of pre-defined inputs for the program, (3) a 
specification of the desired goal of the attacker (expressed as a formula in first-order 
logic) and (4) a set of attack points in the application. It generates a comprehensive 
set of insider attacks that lead to the goal state. For each attack, SymPLAID generates 
both the location (memory or register) to be corrupted as well as the value that must 
be written to the location by the attacker.
SymPLAID directly parses and interprets assembly language programs written for a 
MIPS processor. The current implementation supports the entire range of MIPS 
instructions, including (1) arithmetic/logical instructions, (2) memory accesses (both 
aligned and unaligned) and (3) branches (both direct and indirect). However, it does 
not support system calls. The lack of system call support is compensated for by the 
provision of native support for input/output operations. Floating point operations are 
also not considered by SymPLAID. This is not a bottleneck as floating-point 
operations are typically not used by security-critical code in applications.
SymPLAID is implemented using Maude, a high-performance language and system 
that supports specification and programming in rewriting logic [7]. SymPLAID 
models the execution semantics of an assembly language program using both 
equations and rewriting rules. Equations are used to model the concrete semantics of 
the machine, while rewriting rules are used for introducing non-determinism due to 
symbolic evaluation. SymPLAID maintains precise dependencies both in terms of 
arithmetic and logical constraints and solves the constraints. Hence it does not incur 
false-positives. This is the biggest difference between SymPLAID and SymPLFIED 
[5], which aggregates symbolic values into a single class and incurs false-positives.
5 Case Study: OpenSSH Authentication Module
To evaluate the SymPLAID tool on a real application, we considered a reduced 
version of the OpenSSH application [6] involving only the user-authentication part. 
This is because SymPLAID does not support all the features used in the complete 
SSH application, e.g. system calls. We retain the core functions in the authentication 
part of OpenSSH with little or no modifications, and replace the more complex ones 
with stub versions -  i.e. simplified functions that approximate the behavior of their 
original versions. We also replace the system calls with stubs. The reduced version is 
called the authentication module. The authentication module consists of about 250 
lines of C code and emulates the behavior of the SSH application starting from the 
point after the user enters his/her username and password to the point that he/she is 
authenticated or denied authentication by the system. The authentication module 
consists of about 250 lines of C code (excluding standard libraries). The functions in 
the module are shown in Table 1.
We ran SymPLAID on the authentication module after compiling it to MIPS 
assembly using the gcc compiler. As before, the goal is to find insider attacks that will 
allow the user to be authenticated. It is assumed that the insider can overwrite the 
value of any register prior to executing any instruction within the authentication 
module. The input to the authentication module is the username and password. The
8
username may or may not be a valid username in the system, and the password may 
or may not be correct. These lead to four possible categories, o f which three are 
attacks. SymPLAID discovered attacks corresponding to the categories where an 
invalid username is supplied with a valid password (for the application) and where a 
valid user-name is supplied with an incorrect password. We consider the two 
categories in the rest of this section.
Table 2: Functions in the OpenSSH authentication module
Function Name LOC F unctionality
fakepw 15 Fills a structure with a default (fake) password and returns it
shadow pw 7 Stub version of a system call to retrieve the hash of the password
getpwnam 19 Stub version of a system call to retrieve password for a username
pwcopy 22 Makes a field-by-field copy of the password structure
sys auth passwd 29 Checks if the user supplied password matches system password
allowed_user 6 Stub version of a complex function to check if a user is in the list of allowed users for the system
xcrypt 7 Stub version of a system call to encrypt the password using a salt value (chosen based on username)
getpwnam-allow 43 Checks if a user is allowed to login and if so retrieves their password record makes a copy using pwcopy
auth password 14 Checks if the username is allowed AND the user password is correct
main 47 Reads in the username and password and calls the above functions in the expected order
5.1 Category 1: Example Attack: Invalid User-name
The authentication part of SSH works as follows: when the user enters his/her name, 
the program first checks the user-name against a list of users who are allowed to log 
into the system. If the user is allowed to log into the system, the user record is 
assigned to a data-structure called an authctxt and the user details are stored into the 
authctxt structure. If the name is not found on the list, the record is assigned to a 
special data-structure in memory called as fake, fake is also an authctxt structure, 
except that it holds a dummy username and password. This ensures that there is no 
observable difference in the time it takes to process legitimate and illegitimate users 
(which may enable attackers to learn if a username is valid by repeated attempts).
In order to prevent potential attackers from logging on by providing this dummy 
password, the authctxt structure has an additional field called valid. This field is set to 
true only for legitimate authctxt records i.e. those for which the username is in the list 
of valid users for the system. The fake structure has the valid field set to false by 
default. In order for the authentication to succeed, the encrypted value of the user 
password must match the (encrypted) system password, and the valid flag of the 
authctxt record must be set to 1. Figure 5 shows the auth_password function that 
performs the above checks. The function first calls the sys auth_passwd to check if 
the passwords match, and then checks if the valid flag is set in the authctxt record. 
Only if both conditions are true will the function return 1 (authenticated) to its caller.
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int sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char "‘password) {
I : struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
2: char "‘encrypted_password;
3: char *pw^password -  authctxt->valid ?
4: shadow_pw(pw) : pw->pw_passwd;
5: if (strcmp(pw_password, "") =  0 &&
6: strcmp(password, "") =  0)
7: return (1);
8: encrypted_password = xcrypt(password,
9: (pw_password[0] && pw_password[l]) ?
10: pw_password : "xx");
II : return (strcmp(encrypted_password, pw_password) =  0);
}
int auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password) {
12: int permit_emptyjpasswd = 0;
13: struct passwd * pw = authctxt->pw;
14: int result, ok = authctxt->valid;
15 : if (^password —  '\0' && permit_empty_passwd =  0)
16: return 0;
17: result = sysjtuth_passwd(authctxt, password);
18: if (authctxt->force_pwchange)
19: disable_forwarding();
20: return (result && ok);
i____________________________________
Figure 4: SSH code fragment corresponding to the attack
An insider can launch an attack by setting the valid flag to true for the fake authctxt 
structure. This will authenticate a user who enters an invalid user name, but enters the 
password stored in the fake structure. The password in the fake structure is a string 
that is hardcoded into the program. To mimic this attack, we supply an invalid user- 
name and a password that matches the fake (dummy) password. We expected 
SymPLAID to find the attack where the insider overwrites the valid flag of the fake 
structure. SymPLAID found this attack, but it also found other interesting attacks.
We consider an example of an attack found by SymPLAID. The attack occurs in the 
sys auth_password function, at line 11 before the call to the strcmp function (in 
Figure 4) .At this point, the insider corrupts the value of the stack pointer (stored in 
register $30 in the MIPS architecture) to point within the stack frame of the caller 
function, namely auth_password. When the strcmp function is called, it pushes the 
current frame pointer onto the stack, increments the stack pointer and sets its frame 
pointer to be equal to the value of the stack pointer (corrupted by the attacker).
Figure 5 shows the stack layout when the function is called (only the variables 
relevant to the attack are shown).
sys_auth_
passwd
auth_
strcmp p“ sw
pw  Encrypt*? password
Pw . Perm it.
Pass Result OK pw em pty.
word password
sys_auth_passwd auth_password
Figure 5: Stack layout when strcmp is called
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The top-row of Figure 5 shows the frame-pointers of the functions on the stack due to 
the attack. Observe that the attack causes the stack frame of the strcmp function to 
overlap with that of the auth_password function. The strcmp function is invoked with 
the addresses of the encrypted_pasword and the pw_password buffers in registers2 S3 
and $4. The function copies the contents o f these registers to locations within its stack 
frame at offsets of 4 and 8 respectively from its frame pointer. This overwrites the 
value of the local variable ok in the auth_password function with a non-zero value 
(since both buffers are at non-zero addresses). When the strcmp returns, the value of 
$30 is restored to the frame pointer of sys_auth_passwd, which in turn returns to the 
auth_password function. The auth_password function checks if the result returned 
from sys_auth_password is non-zero and if  the ok flag is non-zero. Both conditions 
are satisfied, so it returns the value 1 to its caller, and the user is successfully 
authenticated by the system.
5.2 Category 2: Incorrect Password
The second category corresponds to the case when the application is executed with a 
valid username but with the wrong password. We ran SymPLAID on the application 
and asked it to find attacks where the user is successfully authenticated. We consider 
a particularly interesting example attack found by SymPLAID.
The attack occurs in the function sys_auth_password shown in Figure 4. As can be 
seen from the Figure, the function sys_authjpassword returns 1 to its caller 
(authjpassword) if either the encrypted version of the user password matches with the 
encrypted version of the system password, OR if both passwords are empty strings. 
In a normal execution of the SSH application, the user password is checked by the 
auth_password function, and if empty, a special flag permit emptypassword is 
checked. This flag indicates if  the user is allowed to have an empty password (at 
account creation time, for example). If the flag is not set, the application is aborted. 
Therefore, under normal circumstances, the user password cannot be empty. However 
in the case where it is empty, the auth_password function returns a value ‘ 1 ’ provided 
the corresponding system password is also empty.
A naïve attacker may try overwriting the value of permitjemptyjjasswd and entering 
an empty string for the password. However, this would require that the system 
password is also empty. Since we assume that only one corruption is allowed per 
execution, the attacker will not be able to corrupt both the system password and the 
user password simultaneously to make both of them point to empty strings, and the 
attack will not succeed. A better option for the attacker may be to overwrite the value 
of the system password (pw_password) after it is returned from the shadow_pw() 
function. This would not work either as the attacker would need to overwrite the user 
password (authctxt->pw) in order for the attack to succeed, which is not possible 
given the single value restriction.
To craft a successful attack, observe that the system password is returned by the 
function shadow_pw (since the username is valid, authctxt->valid is set to 1). 
Therefore, the attacker can try to make shadow_pw return an empty string and in the 
process, also overwrite the contents of the password variable. The difficulty with this 
approach is that shadow_pw is a system call and its value is determined based on the 
value of the system password. Nonetheless, it is possible to make shadow_pw return 
an empty string by passing it a NULL string as argument. This can be done by 
shifting the frame pointer of the sys_auth_passwd function to a memory location
| In the MIPS architecture, registers are used for argument passing.
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where the value stored in the address corresponding to the pw  variable is 0, AND the 
value corresponding to the password variable points to an empty string. The attack is 
carried out after the check on authctxt-> valid but before the call to shadowjpw at line 
4 in Figure 4.
5.3 Spurious Attacks
The approximations in the authentication module may introduce spurious attacks. 
These are attacks that work on the authentication module but do not work on the real 
OpenSSH application. This is because the stub functions in the module introduced 
approximations that did not mimic the real system’s behavior in all cases. Since the 
model-checker explores all possible behaviors of the system, it flagged the non­
conforming cases as attacks on the application..
Most of the spurious attacks discovered were easy to filter out as they were launched 
from stub functions that were system calls in the real program. However, there was 
one subtle attack that at first seemed like a real attack, but turned out to be spurious. 
This is described here in this section.
® currentPos maxSize
t_________________ I___ì ___________________ L
Statically
allocated
chunk
A llo ca te d  M em o ry Free Space
Figure 6: Schematic diagram of chunk allocator
The OpenSSH program uses its own custom memory allocator (xmalloc) to store the 
buffers containing the user and system passwords (not shown in Figure 4). xmalloc 
allocates memory in chunks, and if it runs out of space in the chunk, it calls the 
system malloc to allocate a new chunk. Our authentication module simplifies this 
behavior by allocating a single static chunk of memory when the application is 
initialized, and then satisfying all application malloc requests from this chunk. The 
initial chunk is chosen to be large enough to accommodate both the password buffers 
and other dynamic memory used in the program. In order to ensure that we do not 
exceed the size of the initial chunk, every allocation request in the program is checked 
to ensure that it is within the bounds of the space remaining in the chunk.. Figure 6 
shows a schematic of the allocator.
The simplified memory allocator has a check of the form:
i f  (currentPos + sizeRequested > maxSize) return NULL; 
where currentPos is the location of the next free location in the initial chunk, and 
maxSize is the size of the initial chunk.
The SymPLAID tool finds an attack that effectively overwrites the location of the 
currentPos variable in memory with a value that is greater than the value of maxSize. 
This causes all subsequent malloc requests from the application to be declined and the 
value NULL to be returned. In order to prevent a NULL pointer violation, the calling 
function makes the pointers point to a special sentinel value in memory. If this attack 
is carried out at the beginning of the authentication module (in the getpwnamallow 
function, say), this will cause both the password strings to point to the same sentinel 
value, and hence they will match with each other. Therefore, the sys_authj password 
function will return 1, and the malicious user will be authenticated, thereby leading to 
a successful attack.
In reality, this attack cannot be achieved easily as the custom allocator in ssh will not 
merely return NULL if it exceeds the bounds of the current chunk, but will get a new
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chunk from the operating system (using brk in linux), and maintain a linked list of the 
allocated and free chunks. It is conceivable that a more sophisticated version of the 
attack can be mounted by overwriting the head of the free list with NULL to simulate 
the conditions leading to memory exhaustion. However, we have not tested the more 
sophisticated attack.
The above situation could have been avoided had we modeled a more accurate 
version of the memory allocator used by OpenSSH. However, a similar situation 
could have arisen in any of the other stub functions. Therefore, any approximation of 
system behavior is likely to lead to spurious outcomes. The only way to avoid this 
situation is to analyze the entire system (application, libraries and operating system) 
using the model-checker, but this can lead to state space explosion.
5.4 Performance Results
The model-checking task is highly parallelizable and can be broken into independent 
sub-tasks, with each sub-task considering attacks in a different code region of the 
application. The authentication module consists of about 500 assembly language 
instructions, and the task was broken up into 50 parallel sub-tasks each of which 
analyzes 10 instructions in the program. We executed the sub-tasks on a parallel 
cluster consisting of dual-processor AMD Opteron nodes, each of which has 2 GB 
RAM. The maximum time allowed for each task was capped at 48 hours (2 days).
The maximum time allowed for completion of a sub-task is approximately 2 days 
after which the task is forcibly terminated and its execution time recorded as such.
Table 3: Time taken by SymPLAID for each function
Function Name LOC
(assembly)
Number 
of States
Total Time 
(sec)
Attacks 
found ?
getpwnam Allow 37 6391 325861 No
sys-auth-passwd 54 36896 366108 Yes
fakepw 29 11 115 No
xcrypt 37 26921 429683 Yes -
shadow-pw 26 10342 272236 Yes
allowed-user 20 11 115 Yes
auth-password 40 26921 429683 Yes
getpwnam 37 27724 534601 Yes
pwCopy 52 23547 471185 Yes
main 114 3137 297526 Yes
Table 3 shows the time and space requirements of the sub tasks categorized by the 
function which they were analyzing for attacks. The space requirements are reported 
in terms of the number of unique “states’- visited by the model-checker. The time 
taken is reported in seconds. The results are aggregated across multiple sub-tasks for 
the function and the cumulative time and space requirements are reported. Note that 
this is not equivalent to running the sub-tasks for the function as a single aggregate 
task as the sub-tasks may have significant state sharing across them. Hence the time 
and space taken by a single aggregate task is likely to be smaller than the aggregated 
results in Table 3. Based on the results in Table 3, the total time taken to execute all 
sub-tasks is at most 3127113 seconds or 36.2 days. However, the task finished in less 
than 2 days due to the highly parallel nature of the search task. While the running 
time seems high, it is not a concern as the goal is to discover all potential insider 
attacks (in a reasonable time frame) and to find protection mechanisms against them. 
The analysis can be easily parallelized and executed on multiple nodes as independent
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sub-tasks (as in our case), and hence the analysis time is bound to decrease with the 
advent of multi-core parallel processors.
6 Related Work
Insider attacks have traditionally been modeled at the network level. Philips and 
Swiler [8] introduced the attack graph model to represent the set of all possible 
attacks that can be launched in a network. Ammann et al. [9] introduce a model­
checking based technique to automatically find attacks starting from a known goal 
state of the attacker. Sheyner et. al. generalize this technique to generate all possible 
attack paths, thereby generating the entire attack graph [10]. Chinchani et al. [3] 
present a variant of attack graphs called key-challenge graphs to represent insider 
attacks, and use model-checking to generate all possible insider attacks in a network. 
Insider attacks have been modeled at the operating system level by Probst et al. [4]. In 
this model, applications are represented as sets o f processes that can access sets of 
resources in the system. An insider is modeled as a malicious process in the system. 
Attack-graphs and process graphs are too coarse grained for representing application- 
level attacks, and hence we directly analyze the application’s code. Further, we do not 
require the developer to provide a forma! description of the system being analyzed, 
which can require significant effort. Since we analyze the application’s code directly, 
we can model attacks both in the design and implementation of the application. This 
is important as an insider typically has access to the application’s code, and can 
launch low-level attacks on its implementation.
Symbolic execution is a well-explored technique to find program errors. Recently, it 
has also been used to find security vulnerabilities in applications [11-14]. Symbolic 
techniques are typically concerned with generating application inputs to exploit 
known or unknown vulnerabilities. In contrast, our technique attempts to generate 
attacks under a given input, assuming that the attacker is already present in the 
application. Further, the attacks found using our technique do not require the 
application to have an exploitable vulnerability (e.g. buffer overflows), but can be 
launched by a malicious insider in the system.
Fault-injection is an experimental technique to assess the vulnerability of computer 
systems to random events or faults [15]. Fault-injection has also been used to expose 
security vulnerabilities in applications.. In spite of these limitations, researchers have 
used fault-injection to find security violations in systems. Fault-injection studies [16, 
17] into commonly used cryptographic systems have shown that transient faults can 
weaken the guarantees provided by these systems. The main difference between these 
studies and ours is that our technique can be applied for any general security-critical 
system, and not just crypto-systems. Xu et al. [18] consider the effect of transient 
errors (single-bit flips) in instructions on application security. Govindavajhala and 
Appel [19] explore the effects of transient errors on the security of the Java virtual 
machine, assuming the attacker can execute a specially crafted application. The main 
difference between these techniques and our technique is that we consider all possible 
attacks on the application, and are not restricted to injecting single bit-flips. Further, 
we do not require the attacker to execute specially crafted programs as assumed by 
[19] in order to launch the attack.
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7 Conclusion
This paper presented a novel approach to discover insider attacks in applications. An 
automated technique to find all possible insider attacks on application code is 
presented. The technique uses a combination o f symbolic execution and model- 
checking to systematically enumerate insider attacks for a given goal of the attacker. 
We have implemented the technique in the SymPLAID tool, and demonstrate it using 
the code segments corresponding to the authentication part of the OpenSSH program.
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